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Abstract
Recently there has been extensive research on the changing face of inequality in the 
U.S. housing market.  Initially, the expansion of mortgage loaning to subprime borrowers 
was seen as an equalizing opportunity for people with tarnished credit records or those 
susceptible to discrimination to own a home.  Instead, many people without enough income 
and the proper credentials to own a home are able take out a hefty mortgage that they 
cannot afford and subsequently lose their homes.  In addition, it has opened opportunities 
for inexperienced home buyers to become targets for predatory loans. However, there is yet 
another consequence resulting from the relaxed lending practices which has received much 
less attention. Recently, there has been an increase of fraudulent activity detected which is 
not directly aimed at cheating the borrower.  This fraud-for-profit scheme involves a wide 
range of illegal activities which intentionally leads to the foreclosure of properties, 
devastates neighborhoods, and defrauds banking institutions.  The neighborhood blight is 
severe and has negative consequences for residents such as an inability to sell their 
property, a rise in crime, and unfounded property valuation increases.  My research 
examines the gap in neighborhood inequality research dealing with the fraudulent property 
flipping form of mortgage fraud through a case study of Slavic Village in Cleveland, Ohio.  
I examine the prevalence and process of illegal flipping in Slavic Village using federal and 
local government data, and conduct systematic neighborhood observation of the 
contribution of flipping to neighborhood deterioration.
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Recently there has been extensive research on the changing face of inequality in the 
U.S. housing market.  Initially, the expansion of mortgage loaning to subprime borrowers 
was seen as an equalizing opportunity for people with tarnished credit records or those 
susceptible to discrimination to own a home (Chomsisengphet and Pennington- Cross 
2006).  Instead, many people without enough income and the proper credentials to own a 
home are able take out a hefty mortgage that they cannot afford and subsequently lose their 
homes.  In addition, it has opened opportunities for inexperienced homebuyers as targets 
for predatory loans.  Regardless of any good intentions, the expansion of mortgage lending 
to subprime borrowers is nonetheless problematic as it has only enhanced inequalities 
rather than eliminating them.
However, there is yet another consequence resulting from the relaxed lending 
practices. Recently, there has been an increase of fraudulent activity detected which is not 
directly aimed at cheating the borrower.   The practice of illegal flipping, which had been 
virtually undetected for some time, has emerged as the most common mortgage fraud 
practice (FBI.gov 2006).   This fraud-for-profit scheme involves a wide range of illegal 
activities which intentionally leads to the foreclosure of properties devastates 
neighborhoods and defrauds banking institutions.  The neighborhood blight is severe and 
has negative consequences for residents such as; an inability to sell their property, a rise in 
crime, and unfounded property valuation increases.  On a larger scale, the foreclosures and 
other negative consequences perpetuate stratification and neighborhood segregation. 
Moreover there may be additional implications on the national level due to the bankruptcy 
of lending institutions and an increase in foreclosures.  Ultimately, this may have had grave 
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consequences possibly contributing to the subprime mortgage crisis, property 
overvaluation, bursting of the housing bubble and the current economic recession.
 Whereas in the past, redlining was a popular institutionalized form of 
neighborhood inequality, illegal flipping has become a new avenue in augmenting 
segregation and stratification.  The questions then arise, how has this change in 
institutionalized practices changed over time?   Have there been significant changes in the 
mortgage lending process that allowed for this practice? Furthermore, how does the process 
occur?  It has also raised the question of how these practices contribute to urban blight.  My 
research will therefore focus on the extent of the social and economic damage on 
neighborhoods.  For example, how prevalent is this practice and is it concentrated in certain 
areas?  I hypothesize that fraudulent flipping will be prevalent in certain low income 
neighborhoods and even show the extent of the damage through entire streets with mainly 
foreclosed and abandoned properties.  Generally, this research project will focus on how 
predatory flipping has been influential in the new face of housing inequality and 
perpetuates the stratification of low income neighborhoods.  
 My research examines the gap in neighborhood inequality research dealing with 
the fraudulent property flipping form of mortgage fraud through a case study of Slavic 
Village in Cleveland, Ohio.  Once a thriving industrial neighborhood comprised of Czech 
and Polish immigrants, Slavic Village has faced a great deal of change in the last few 
decades. The old neighborhood has deteriorated greatly and experienced an influx of low-
income minorities, mainly African Americans (NHlink.net).  I chose to focus on Slavic 
Village for the case study because it is known to be the epicenter of predatory flipping and 
has been hit hard by the foreclosure crisis.  The result has been a neighborhood filled with 
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vacant and boarded-up properties. The media has dubbed Slavic Village “Ground Zero” 
based on its reputation for being inflicted with numerous flipping schemes.  This 
distinction is largely due to the exploits of one particular group of people responsible for 78 
flipped properties in the area (CNN money.com; prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us). 
Predatory flipping is a newly publicized form of mortgage fraud that plagues the 
mortgage lending agencies and has serious consequences on a neighborhood’s condition, 
foreclosure rates, property values, crime incidence, and costs to the government, leading to 
severe deterioration of the neighborhood and ultimately reinforcing neighborhood 
inequality.  The pervasiveness of flipping and its oppressive burden on a neighborhood are 
exemplified in the case study of Slavic Village.  In addition to local effects, predatory 
flipping may also have had an impact on the current subprime mortgage crisis and housing 
bubble burst both locally and nationally.
BACKGROUND: SLAVIC VILLAGE AND THE HOUSING CRISIS
Slavic Village is a historically ethnic neighborhood located in Cleveland, Ohio east 
of downtown, which has encountered a great deal of change in recent decades typical of a 
Cleveland neighborhood.  A once thriving industrial working class neighborhood 
comprised of Czech and Polish immigrant families has now essentially turned to slums 
(nhlink.net).  Widespread suburbanization, change in the racial makeup, aging 
infrastructure, and economic restructuring all occurred in Slavic Village changing the 
nature of the community and essentially representing the economic segregation in 
Cleveland (journalism.nyu.edu 2008; nytimes.com 2009; Senate Hearing on Crisis: 
Cleveland Under Siege).
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Then, in the 1990s the neighborhood found itself in the midst of a comeback.  The 
Slavic Village Community Development Corporation and other non-profit and government 
organizations instituted significant improvement and stabilization efforts which in turn 
increased housing prices.  At this time, it was the goal to revitalize the neighborhood by 
increasing the tax base and improving local resources, (Interview; Task Force Report 2008; 
Case Western Reserve Symposium).
Unfortunately, these efforts eventually backfired.  The attraction of the 
revitalization and rising home prices made Slavic Village appeal to inexperienced 
homebuyers, prime targets for aggressive subprime lending tactics (Interview; nytimes.com 
2009; journalism.nyu.edu 2008).  Slavic Village became disproportionately dominated by 
subprime loans.  Between 2005 and 2006, 68% of loan originations in the area were of the 
high-cost type; whereas, during that same period nationally, only 28% were reported high-
cost loans. (Task Force; HDMA).
The result was severe deterioration and a foreclosure epidemic.  Foreclosures 
increased 600% since 2000 resulting in the appearance of a grave number of vacant and 
abandoned homes (Task Force; HDMA; NeoCando.case.edu).  During this period, a 
significant trend in mortgage fraud occurred in the form of fraudulent property flipping. 
Fraudulent Flipping involves key players including buyers, sellers, and appraisers, who 
obtain false documents in order to sell cheap, dilapidated properties in low income 
neighborhoods for an inflated profit by taking advantage of relaxed mortgage lending 
restrictions.  Flipping was able to take place in Slavic Village because it was masked by the 
pre-existing housing bubble.
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Essentially, the increasing home prices and housing demand in Slavic Village 
created its own local housing bubble boom and bust and is representative of the national 
housing and financial problems in the greater United States.  A housing bubble involves 
extremely elevated property valuations over time.  People buy homes at inflated prices with 
hopes of future appreciation and due to this speculation, prices should continue to rise. 
However, continued price growth is unsustainable and will peak until it becomes 
unaffordable (Karlsson 2004; Roberts 2008).  Eventually in the United States this 
proliferation became unable to sustain itself, and prices began to drop in 2006.
The Case-Schiller home price index indicated that Cleveland is one of the cities that 
did not initially experience a housing bubble like the rest of the United States.  It contended 
that since prices only appreciated moderately, the eventual bust will also be moderate. 
However, the Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank reports indicate that there actually occurred 
a greater difference then originally thought when examined by price tiers.  The low price 
tier (under $111,071) actually did indicate a bubble, appreciating by more than 6% per year 
between 1987-2005.  Since that period, there has been 37% price depreciation in the low 
tier.  This seems to be indicative of the situation in Slavic Village.
Moreover, Slavic Village is representative of the subprime lending and foreclosure 
crisis. Deregulation of the lending market allowed for irresponsible lending to unworthy 
homebuyers such as no-doc loans which allow for little oversight while lenders make a 
profit.  Also, it allowed for predatory practices such as exceedingly high interest rates. 
Subprime and predatory lending paved the way for the foreclosure crisis, with many 
borrowers defaulting.
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HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES AND INEQUALITY
It is important to consider the history of segregation practices in order to understand 
the new inequality and how the extension of flipping has impacted it. In the past, 
neighborhood inequality was achieved through institutionalized stratification practices 
which were very different than the mechanisms that are used today.  In fact, the main 
purpose of the old inequality was to deny loans and homeownership to targeted groups of 
people, mainly the poor and African American communities; whereas today because of the 
extension of subprime lending, the same groups are offered unwarranted credit, under 
predatory terms, with hardly any collateral.
Old Inequality
The housing sector has long been a determinate of uneven development and social 
stratification (Gotham, 2002).  Throughout the history of housing policy, privatism has 
been the underlying theme.  It is the laissez- faire policy based on individualism and self 
interest that has long been a value of the U.S. government in which business is entitled to 
have relatively free range for the good of the market (Squires 1994).   Gotham (2002) 
explains the pervasiveness of privatism in the United States: “as an ideology and political 
strategy, privatism has been the mechanism through which public policy and private 
actions have traditionally reinforced and perpetuated elite corporate interests and social 
inequalities,”(10).  The elite interests shape government policy, including in the housing 
sector. Many researchers of spatial inequality (Gotham 1994; Squires 2006; Williams, 
Nesiba, and Mcconnell 2005) attribute this philosophy to be the basis for allowing 
institutionalized stratification practices and thus uneven development. 
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The development of the modern mortgage system that began in the 1930s was 
initiated to stimulate home building and restructure the U.S. banking and lending 
institutions following the crash of the banking system in the Great Depression. 
Unfortunately, it also marked the beginning of federally endorsed policies condoning 
institutionalized racism in the housing market.  In fact, the National Housing Act of 1934 
was intended to increase demand and make home loans more affordable.  The 1934 
Housing Act created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to create a fair mortgage 
lending system.  It established low down payments, high loan-to-value ratios, and long-
term amortization in government loans which increased the payment schedule time through 
monthly payments (Gotham 2002; HUD).  The new FHA insurance policy for private 
mortgage lenders provided “protection against losses as the result of homeowners 
defaulting on their mortgage loans,” (HUD) which increases the tendency to lend.  Despite 
the sound mortgage system restructuring, the elitist real estate community had control over 
policy making during this crucial reformation period enabling the advancement of their 
own ideology (Gotham 2002).
This ideology incorporated privatism and racial discrimination in the housing 
sector.  The main goal of the real estate elites was to create racially homogeneous 
neighborhoods.  Neighborhood segregation was achieved through the legal use of 
restrictive covenants and subdivisions.  Property owners and neighborhood associations 
formed agreements which legally prohibited minorities especially Blacks, from buying or 
renting property in White neighborhoods.  Real Estate Boards and neighborhood 
organizations ensured the implementation of these practices (Carr and Kutty 2008; Gotham 
2002; Massey and Denton 1993).  The rationale was that racially and socially homogenous 
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neighborhoods protected property values.  African Americans were actually seen as an 
economic liability.  This advanced the practice of redlining, or denying loans to areas 
evaluated as high risk including poor and minority neighborhoods.  Redlining was a legal 
practice sanctioned by the FHA which determined in the 1939 Underwriting Manual that 
“if a neighborhood is to retain stability it is necessary that properties shall continue to be 
occupied by the same social and racial classes,” (Carr and Kutty 2008).  
Appraisals and evaluation of property values was essential in deciding whether an 
area was suitable for loaning and ultimately advanced the system of institutionalized 
segregation.  Lenders determine property values based on an appraisal and the value of a 
property was largely determined by the racial and ethnic concentration (Squires 1994).  In 
fact, Gotham (2002) illustrates that, the use of covenants “stimulate consumer demand for 
racially exclusive neighborhoods, and in effect, established the precept that the value of 
housing is dependent on the race of the occupants,” (23).  This ultimately “helped nurture 
emerging racial prejudices and stereotypes that associated black residence with declining 
property values, [and] deteriorating neighborhoods,” (23).  This was also seen in the 
practice of redlining which blatantly denied loans to areas deemed unsuitable based on 
property values, or rather neighborhoods that were racially mixed (Carr and Kutty 2008; 
Gotham 2002; Massey and Denton 1993; Squires 1994).
The next step in the real estate market’s reinforcement of spatial segregation is its 
direct support of racially motivated suburbanization.  The low- and middle-income whites 
who lived in racially mixed neighborhoods were subsequently denied credit as well.  After 
World War II, the home builders took advantage of the FHA subsidies, however, this was 
only allowed in white neighborhoods due to the appraisal requirement.  Thus, the white 
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residents of racially mixed neighborhoods left to ensure FHA subsidized housing in a 
secure white neighborhood. Moreover, these practices lead to neighborhood decline and 
disinvestment.  This segregationist ideology was actually the real estate elite’s deliberate 
attempt to exploit racial fears for their own financial gain.  Demand for white families to 
migrate to a racially homogenous neighborhood inflated property values in White 
neighborhoods.  Additionally, real estate agents were able to manipulate Black residents to 
make a profit (Gotham 2002; Massey 2008; Massey and Denton1993; Squires 1994).
This occurred through the 1960s unit the Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968, the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, and 
the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, all of which shifted the policy of segregation to 
fair housing and mortgage lending (Squires 1994).  Though, the policies were not always 
successful.  The 1968 Act instituted Section 235 which relaxed lending standards to allow 
lending to the poor.  However, this allowed real estate speculators to profit from property 
flipping with little improvements to the poor.  It also perpetuated the “White Flight” 
ideology due to the stigmatism of Section 235 housing (Gotham 2000).  The effect was 
deterioration in the black inner city neighborhoods.  The real estate agents continued to 
assist in the dual housing market (Gotham 2000).
In much of the 20th century, there were many federally endorsed discriminatory 
practices such as restrictive covenants, redlining, and the institutionalized exclusion of 
minorities during the suburbanization boom all of which were marked by real estate elite 
profiteering.  Now known as the “old inequality”, these policies lead to severe racial 
segregation (Gotham 2000; Bond and Williams 2007; Williams, Nesiba and Mcconnell 
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2005).  The changes in the 60s and 70s were insufficient and it was not until the 1990s that 
an increase of lending to low income and minority buyers occurred.
New Inequality
Many researchers have analyzed the consequences of these past institutionalized 
practices, however new methods were borne in the 1990s, which shaped the concept of the 
“new inequality”. The shift came from economic restructuring resulting in the expansion of 
mortgage lending to high risk borrowers, often the poor and minority communities. This 
did not eliminate inequality in the housing market as one may expect, it simply took a new 
form.  Instead of having trouble getting a loan, minorities are now subject to “less desirable 
loan terms, exposure to predatory practices and a lack of consumer protection,”(Williams, 
Nesiba and Mcconnell 2005).  Though homeownership increased among the 
disadvantaged, the changes in the mortgage lending industry allowed for the influx of 
predatory practices by subprime lenders, such as reverse redlining (Williams, Nesiba and 
Mcconnell 2005). 
The idea of laissez faire economics and neoclassical economics was expanded with 
the deregulation of the mortgage lending industry (Williams, Nesiba, Mcconnell, 2005).  In 
effect, the elite private enterprises in the housing industry were able to secure private 
interests in the government which promote deregulation and not the public interest 
(Gotham, 1994).  The transformation in the 1990s regarding deregulation in the market 
lead to major increases in homeownership, especially for low-income persons and 
minorities, (Williams, Nesiba, Mcconnell, 2005) through the means of subprime lending to 
borrowers with less than perfect credit, (Squires, Kubrin, 2006). This follows the 
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neoclassical economic theory which highlights the positives of subprime lending, 
(Williams, Nesiba, Mcconnell, 2005).  However, there are major pitfalls with subprime 
lending that can contribute to inequalities which is best represented by Tillman and 
Indergaard’s (1999) application of sociological networks theory, (Williams, Nesiba, 
Mcconnell, 2005).  Application of sociological networks theory on market restructuring 
indicates that opportunities for exploitation emerge.
This theory initiates the discussion of inequality in the housing sector through 
predatory lending. Subprime lending has resulted in a proliferation of loan defaults and 
common risky practices such as adjustable rate mortgages and also predatory lending 
practices such as steering of minorities towards the subprime market which have been in 
the forefront of today’s research and policy initiatives (Carr and Kolluri Fannie Mae). 
These practices are purposefully committed against subprime borrowers for profit.
After decades of redlining and institutionalized segregation, the same people and 
areas affected by predatory and irresponsible subprime lending and continue to suffer from 
inequality.  Thus, these predatory practices have been dubbed “reverse redlining.”  While 
redlining was a method of denying credit to minorities and low income individuals, 
predatory lending preys on these people by irresponsible lending.  It simply perpetuates 
pre-existing inequality (Squires, Kubrin, 2006).
The New Inequality Extended
Clearly, restructuring of mortgage lending practices has greatly transformed the 
housing sector and the methods pertaining to uneven development.  However, mortgage 
fraud, notably fraudulent property flipping, has not yet been directly associated with the 
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new residential inequality theory.  The effects are widespread in the areas inflicted with 
this fraud however a proper examination is needed in order to link flipping as a process of 
inequality.
Flipping can be considered another consequence resulting from the relaxed lending 
practices. Recently, there has been an extension of fraudulent activity detected which is not 
directly aimed at cheating the borrower.   Due to its nature, the practice of illegal flipping 
can go virtually undetected for some time, but this is not a new phenomenon.  However, it 
has emerged as the most common mortgage fraud practice (FBI.gov 2006) and with the 
state of the U.S. financial and housing markets it has become increasingly relevant.  This 
fraud-for-profit scheme involves a wide range of illegal activities which intentionally 
allows the foreclosure of properties devastates neighborhoods and defrauds banking 
institutions.  The neighborhood blight is severe and has negative consequences for 
residents such as and inability to sell their property, crime and effects from the housing 
bubble.
It may be difficult to see flipping as contributing to inequality because its intent is 
much different than the practices in the past, such as redlining.  Whereas the old inequality 
intentionally segregated minorities away from the white and/or affluent community, 
flipping is an opportunistic practice of industry insiders to gain a profit.  The segregative 
nature lies in the cost of their greed.  The most direct effect is the cost to the banking 
institutions from which the perpetrators steal from; however, it is the secondary component 
that affect a neighborhood.  The flippers inflict foreclosures on a neighborhood with little 
or no regard for the vicinity and its residents. Or, they may not understand the full effects 
that occur at this level.  Nevertheless, the consequences are extensive.  Also, if the scheme 
14
involves manipulating a buyer, rather than collusion, the buyer will most likely be left with 
an overvalued home in complete disrepair.
Thus, fraudulent flipping shares a number of similarities with predatory lending and 
the new inequality.  First, both are schemes for profit.  So the differentiation between intent 
of the old inequality and predatory flipping is compatible with the new inequality.  An 
interesting facet of the old inequality is that an in depth analysis highlights similar 
profiteering, though not as blatant.  However, the nature of the profiteering was racial 
segregation to manipulate demand rather than manipulation of increased supply of loans to 
low income people. In other words, the old inequality structured the dual housing market 
but the new inequality advanced and perpetuated the dual housing market.  Second, even 
though it may seem on the surface that predatory lending and reverse redlining have a more 
direct effect on spatial inequality due to the disproportionate effects on minorities and low 
income populations, property flippers must target an area where they can buy homes for 
cheap.  Thus, “there is growing evidence that property flipping has become epidemic in 
low-income urban housing markets,” (Focer, 2000).  An examination by Ada Focer (2000) 
cites a Cleveland Plain-Dealer article that states “1000 flips, worth more than $31million, 
have occurred there since 1997, about 80 percent in the lowest income East Side 
neighborhoods,” (Focer, 2000).  Thirdly, neither of these policies are institutionalized or 
condoned by the government.  They are deemed fraudulent activities.   Also, both practices 
are more centered on economic characteristics of lenders rather than racial characteristics 
like the old inequality.  Finally, both predatory lending and fraudulent flipping have the 
same effects of foreclosure, neighborhood deterioration, and persistence of racial and 
economic segregation.
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DATA AND METHODS
The case study of Slavic Village covers 1) the process and prevalence of flipping 
using comparative evidence nationally and in Slavic Village and; 2) a neighborhood 
analysis.  The first portion includes documentary evidence on the situation in Slavic 
Village from a variety of sources including features from different media outlets, FBI data, 
and evidence collected from the Slavic Village Vacant and Abandoned Property Task 
Force.  The second portion includes an observational survey of Slavic Village and 
incorporates census and property data.
Evidence of Flipping
I first developed a clear understanding of the flipping crisis in Slavic Village as in 
intern at the community development corporation, Slavic Village Development (SVD), in 
the summer of 2007, where I attended a few task force meetings.  The identification of 
predatory flipping came from Councilman Anthony Brancatelli, former SVD director and 
current city councilman for the area.  He began to notice property inflations on decrepit 
properties in Slavic Village as early as 1999 (New York Times 2009).  Around 2005 he 
noticed a great deal of real estate transfer listings in the Cleveland Plain Dealer with the 
same issue.  Further delving into the property sales illuminated patterns of similar buyers 
and sellers, mortgage lenders and evidence of property flipping.  He soon shared this 
information with his ties at SVD and the task force (The Plain Dealer 2008).
 I also contributed slightly to The Slavic Village Vacant and Abandoned Property 
Task Force report entitled Subprime Lending, Real Estate Flipping, and the Foreclosure 
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Crisis in Slavic Village 2003-2008.  My tasks included checking MLS listings from the 
Slavic Village area for possible illegal flipping red flags on the Cuyahoga County 
Auditor’s website, and the Cuyahoga Clerk of Courts website in order to add to the flipping 
database.  Red flags indicated on the property’s history on the websites include; a short 
turn-over period, large discrepancy between buying and selling price, inflated selling price 
compared to County assessed market value, foreclosure before and after flipper transaction, 
and common flipping cohorts.  Most importantly, the brief time I spent at Slavic Village 
Development allowed me to gain knowledge of the process and become familiarized with 
crisis as a whole.
I relied extensively on the final version of the Task Force Report, which includes a 
table identifying Selected Flipper Transactions in SVD Service Area 2003-2006.  These 
transactions were chosen based on the severity of the flip, such as a significant discrepancy 
between the flipper’s sales price and county assessed value.  The report highlights the high 
frequency of fraudulent speculator activities in Slavic Village.  There were 126 selected 
transactions.  According to the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, 78 of these properties were 
perpetrated by the same mortgage broker, Mark Kellogg, and his flipping ring (Cuyahoga 
County Prosecutor)
Recently the FBI has compiled as much data as possible on mortgage fraud and 
fraudulent property flipping and is committed to combating mortgage fraud (FBI.gov 
Mortgage Fraud Overview).  The FBI mortgage fraud reports rely heavily on the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement network and Suspicious Activity Reports for estimates on the 
prevalence of fraud.  There are many types of mortgage fraud which are reported by the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) Regulatory Policy and Programs 
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Division.  Though, there is not a mandatory system of fraud reporting for all of the 
financial institutions, the FinCen reports are based on Suspicious Activity Report (SARs) 
Analysis. The SARs are in a database filed from a portion of financial institutions.  The 
November 2006 report contains data from April 1, 1996 through March 31, 2006 and a 
second report reviews data from April 2006 through March 2007.  These reports show the 
increasing prevalence and trends of mortgage fraud activities.  The two main suspicious 
activities looked at in this paper are illegal property flipping and appraisal fraud.  However, 
there are other schemes that are also associated with flipping such as material 
misrepresentation/false statements and straw buyers.
 I continued to research newspaper articles and other documentary evidence of 
Slavic Village including its problems with predatory and irresponsible lending, 
foreclosures, and fraudulent flipping in order to investigate the effects of flipping, to 
understand the conditions that allowed the opportunity to commit fraud, and assess the 
national implications on the current financial state.  The national media has focused on 
Slavic Village as the epicenter for foreclosures and fraudulent flipping.  Newsweek 
published the article, “How Questionable Loans Created a Cleveland Slum” in 2008 which 
explains the process of flipping based on the workings of mortgage broker Mark Kellogg’s 
flipping ring, responsible for 71 flips at the time of the article (currently being prosecuted 
for 78 properties).  CNN Money published a series of articles under the category 
Cleveland: Foreclosure’s Perfect Storm which dealt with the Slavic Village crisis in 
particular (CNNMoney.com).  The New York Times Magazine also published a thorough 
article entitled “All Boarded Up – Slavic Village and the Foreclosure Crisis.”  The 
Washington Post and NPR also published articles of similar importance.  In addition to the 
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national media recognition, various Congressional Hearings also document the troubles in 
Slavic Village.
Neighborhood Observation
 A significant portion of my research is derived from a survey of Slavic Village and 
an analysis on property condition and sales prices.  In a series of 7 trips from January to 
April 2009, I drove around and surveyed the condition of the properties in several census 
tracts and noted the overall state of the neighborhood.  The fraudulently flipped properties 
were highlighted red on the map of Slavic Village.  Census Tracts with many flips were 
distinguished from tracts with few flips.  Census tract 1149 was chosen to be the 
representative sample of a Slavic Village tract with many flips.  There were 23 flips in this 
area.  The neighborhood was surveyed marking and color coding properties as 1) flipped in 
red, 2) vacant in magenta, 3) boarded in purple, 4) substandard condition in green, and 5) 
average or good condition in yellow.  This determination is based on several factors such 
as; broken windows, roof condition, siding condition (including if it has been stripped for 
aluminum), and condition of the yard.  A property determined as substandard usually will 
have multiple substandard criteria.  The categorization of the properties is subjective.  The 
properties are compared to each other and the condition must be determined in the overall 
context of a low income neighborhood.  For example, a property considered average in this 
neighborhood may be considered poor condition in a more affluent neighborhood.  The 
methodology I incorporated into the study of surveying Slavic Village is taken from the 
methodology of Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush in their article “Ecometrics: 
Toward a Science of Assessing Ecological Settings, with Application to the Systematic 
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Social Observation of Neighborhoods” in which they cite the observation and surveying of 
a neighborhood as an important statistical tool in assessing a neighborhood condition 
(Raudenbush and Sampson 1999).
The homes that were evaluated were single- and multi- family residential homes 
excluding apartment buildings.  Land Bank vacant areas and homes with a rental disclosure 
owned by Cleveland Housing Network were not accounted for due to the skewed data for 
the purpose of market value and sales prices. This includes many of the new subdivisions 
built by non profit groups.    917 properties in tract 1149 were accounted for and analyzed 
in this study.  
The properties and their condition are plugged into a spreadsheet along with market 
values and sale prices.  Market value assessments are determined by the county with an 
update every three years.  The years documented in this study are 1997, 2000, 2003, and 
2006.  The data from 2009 has not yet been published.  The sales data is compiled from 
1997 to 2008. The data on the sales is intended to determine the impact of fraudulent flips 
on neighborhood sales and tax values.  The color coding of the properties is also used to 
compare condition to value.  The median values have been calculated and graphed. 
RESULTS
The Process and Prevalence of Flipping in Slavic Village
FBI defines mortgage fraud as a scheme involving a mortgage with “material 
misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission…” (FBI.gov).   It is categorized as fraud for 
profit and 80% of fraudulent schemes are committed by industry insiders.  Slavic Village 
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has been hit hard with fraudulent flipping and appraisal fraud which is usually perpetrated 
by the same cast of characters from 2000-2007. 
Illegal property flipping involves a process of obtaining false documents in order to 
sell a cheap, dilapidated property most likely in a low income neighborhood for an inflated 
profit.  The flipper purchases this home for a low price and obtains fraudulent appraisals to 
value the property for more than it is actually worth.  A buyer, usually involved in the 
scheme, takes out a hefty loan for purchasing the property. Many times, straw buyers do 
not qualify for a loan; however the “flipper” employs crooked mortgage brokers who 
falsify documents to make sure they qualify.  This process is facilitated by the relaxed 
lending standards of subprime lending and the securitization of the market which decreases 
the lender’s risk of loaning to unqualified buyers.  No-document loans do not require 
income and important financial indicators to be reported.  However, sometimes an 
inexperienced straw buyer is solicited for a fee and duped as they are left responsible for 
the property, destroying their credit.  Finally, the title company and mortgage broker can be 
involved, committing indiscretions of falsifying documents and lying to the lending 
institution.  The loaned money is taken as a profit and then split with the flipper’s 
conspirators including the buyer, the appraiser, mortgage broker, and title companies. 
Eventually, the borrower will not make payments resulting in foreclosure of the home.
There has been an incredible increase of mortgage fraud reporting overall. 
Between 1997 and 2005 SARs categorized as mortgage loan fraud increased by 1,411% 
and continues to increase in 2006.  There are many structural factors that have contributed 
to this increase.  The 2006 report attributes the “increased awareness of the potential for 
fraud in a dynamic real estate market,” (4) as one explanation.  In other words, the 
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perpetrators have capitalized on the rapidly increasing property value growth during this 
time period (2006 FinCen; FBI Financial Crimes Report).  Nationally, the average annual 
growth rate in property values was 6% between 1975 and 2005.  However, in the first 
quarter of 2005 the national growth rate was 12.5% (2006 FinCen).  Moreover, industry 
insiders, involved in 80% of reported fraud losses, have incorporated an “educated criminal 
element that is using identity theft, straw borrowers, shell companies, along with industry 
insiders, to conceal their methods and override lender controls” (FBI Financial Crimes 
Report).  The relaxed lending policies, including little or no-document loans has facilitated 
fraudulent activity (2006 FinCen).
The 2007 FBI Financial Crimes Report to the Public advises not to compare 
predatory lending practices with mortgage fraud because predatory lending affects 
borrowers whereas mortgage fraud affects lending institutions.  While this fact is true and 
there are ways in which they differ, both practices yield similar results of foreclosure, 
blight, and neighborhood deterioration, which in itself translate into inequality.  Property 
flipping flourishes due to increasing property values, but eventual foreclosure will 
ultimately lead to severe decline in property values for the flipped property and 
neighboring properties, perpetuating inequality. Both practices disproportionately and 
negatively affect, subprime, low income people.
The dynamics of the lending market caused a significant concentration of deterioration 
and foreclosure in Slavic Village.  Investigations identified an additional factor, fraudulent 
property flipping, which was contributing to the foreclosure crisis.  Flipping both benefited 
from and contributed to the severe foreclosure crisis.  Subprime and irresponsible, often 
predatory, lending, which basically obliterated Slavic Village, has paved the way for 
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mortgage fraud in the form of fraudulent appraisal and property flipping to occur.  The 
predatory flippers were able to take advantage of the situation in Slavic Village.  This 
irresponsible lending has created an unequal footing for the people living in the 
neighborhood, for both subprime borrowers and their unsuspecting neighbors.  The Vacant 
and Abandoned Property Task Force in Slavic Village indicates that this area has been 
overwhelmed with high-cost or subprime loans.  They have documented that 68% of loans 
originated in the area were defined as high-cost between 2005 and 2006.  This is 
substantially higher than the national average which was between 26% and 28% during the 
same period.  Moreover, research shows that the “Strongest predictor of a loan foreclosing 
is its status as subprime,” (Coulton et al. 2008).  While subprime loans have allowed for an 
increase in home ownership based on racial and economic characteristics, there are 
indications that subprime loans are segregated by income and race just as the housing 
market has historically been (Coulton et. al. 2008).  
Slavic Village shows characteristics of a low income neighborhood.  In Slavic 
Village, the 1999 poverty rate was approximately 27% and the median household income 
was approximately $24,500 according to the 2000 census (NEO CANDO).  It is also one of 
6 neighborhoods in Cleveland included in the Neighborhood Progress Inc. Strategic 
Investment Initiative.  This program intends to restore neighborhoods and initiate “market 
recovery” (neighborhoodprogress.org).  This distinction is due in large part to the 
neighborhood vacancy and foreclosures resulting from the subprime lending and 
inexperienced homebuyers.
Mortgage fraud results in significant costs both to the banks and to the cities.  Mark 
Kellogg who is responsible for 78 flips in Slavic Village accounts for the loss of $5.8 
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million in loans defrauded and stolen from various banking institutions (Cuyahoga county 
prosecutor).  The FBI cites a $1 billion dollar loss in loans in 2005 from various mortgage 
fraud schemes.  However, it is difficult to record the exact amount of SAR activity so the 
cost is projected to be higher (SAR).  The cost to the city and taxpayers is also grave.  One 
of the most significant outcomes from foreclosed and abandoned homes is the increase in 
unkempt properties.  They are both an eyesore and a costly nuisance.  CNN reports the fees 
to the city are lawn upkeep and board up liens.  The average cost to cut grass for one lot in 
Slavic Village is $300. Cleaning trash from a yard can cost $1,000 and board up fees can 
cost around $500. The Cuyahoga auditor also shows charges for sewers and demolition 
fees.  There are also numerous homes in Slavic Village that are unoccupied or boarded so 
the cost skyrockets.  In 2007, Jim Rokakis, Cuyahoga County Treasurer, reports to CNN 
that more than 800 homes are vacant in the area.
Fraudulent flipping has had similar consequences as reverse redlining and other 
forms of inequality resulting from abandoned homes.  In 2007 Cleveland had four of the 
top 21 ZIP codes for foreclosure filings in the United States.  The Slavic Village area zip 
code, 44105, tops the June 2007 list in the entire U.S. with 783 foreclosure filings (CNN). 
CNN reports a high incidence of crime in Slavic Village resulting from vacant homes. 
Rokakis explains the first result of foreclosure is the emergence of squatters and looters 
into the abandoned homes.  The average time for a newly vacated home to be looted is 72 
hours.  Gutters are removed and properties are littered with trash.  One of the most apparent 
crimes is the stripping of aluminum siding and piping, including copper, wiring, and PVC. 
The purpose is to sell the commodities on the black market.  The homes are left worthless 
and in need of costly restoration.  The article reports the need of $100 million for repairs. 
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Due to this cost, it is often more appropriate to simply demolish the house, another 
devastating blow to the community. Stacy Pugh, housing director at SVD also cites arson 
as another crime resulting in deterioration of the neighborhood.   The value of their 
neighboring homes has deteriorated greatly.  Mike Graham, Cleveland representative for a 
national appraisal company Zaio Corporation, reports to CNN that the 25-40% home 
devaluations in Slavic Village compared to the 4.2% for all of Cleveland.  This results in 
the inability for neighbors to sell their homes.  They are stuck and surrounded by blight and 
crime.  The purposeful foreclosing of illegally flipped homes exacerbates the situation.
Mortgage fraud, including property flipping and appraisal fraud, have serious 
implications on the national financial market.  In an April 1, 2009 statement before the 
House Committee on the Judiciary John S. Pistole, Deputy Director of the FBI recently 
referred to the importance of mortgage fraud on the U.S. economy.  In the current financial 
crisis, “financial institutions have reduced their assets by more than $1.2 trillion.”  Pistole 
continues to explain that while mortgage fraud is not the “sole source, of the current 
financial crisis; however, it would be irresponsible to neglect mortgage fraud’s impact on 
the U.S. housing and financial market.” 
Flipping and Neighborhood Decline
The survey taken of Slavic Village recorded the intense blight seen in the tract 
accounting for 917 residential properties excluding land bank.  Substandard homes 
accounted for 13% of the tract, boarded homes for 11% and demolished for 10%.  Together 
the blight accounts for 34% of the neighborhood.  23 properties were fraudulently flipped 
which accounted for 3% of the tract.  The majority of the homes (63%) were in standard 
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condition for the neighborhood tract.  This demonstrates the polarization of the housing 
market in Slavic Village.  While some homes are severely deteriorated, others are relatively 
nice working class homes.  The standard condition category contains a variation of homes 
considered standard condition including those that are new construction and those that are 
well kept, older homes. One shortcoming of this study is the failure to represent the full 
effect of abandoned homes because many of the standard homes may be in some stage of 
the foreclosure process.  Figure 1 shows the results of the survey in tract 1149. 
The data on the condition of the properties including vacancy and foreclosure 
highlights the concentrated poverty and blight in the area.  The appearance of blight is 
obvious simply by driving around and observing the differences among streets.  Some 
streets have been hit harder than others, as the fraudulent and/or flipping properties tend to 
be concentrated together. Moreover, some census tracts have been hit harder than others. 
These areas that are targeted by the flippers are usually areas that have already been 
devastated by foreclosure due to the subprime lending problem in the area.  The subprime 
lending problem resulting in foreclosures has lead to the opportunity for fraudulent flippers 
to buy properties for a cheap price.  The perpetrator can use the more expensive rehabbed 
properties in the area to account for the high value of the fake appraisal.  Once a property 
has been flipped, the neighboring properties are favorable areas to continue to process all 
over again because they can now use the fraudulent appraisals and sales prices as 
comparable data.  Therefore, entire streets are often plagued by severe deterioration.  The 
blight a street has incurred from inexperienced homebuyers being foreclosed on is 
worsened by the flipped properties that populate the area.  For example East 65th St. in tract 
1149 contains 3 fraudulently flipped properties.  The street is divided in half by average 
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condition and deteriorated condition.  East 70th in tract 1149 contains 2 flipped properties 
and 60% of properties are deteriorated.
According to HUD user the estimated foreclosure rate in tract 1149 was 16.7% 
between January 2007 and June 2008.  The estimated amount of foreclosures was 51.  In all 
of Slavic Village the estimated rate was 15.8% and the amount of estimated foreclosures 
was 537.  This means that the selected tract 1149 accounted for 10.5% of the estimated 
foreclosures in Slavic Village during this time period.  HUD user also documented data 
from the United States Postal Service on 90 Day Vacant Residential Addresses as of June 
2008.  Tract 1149 had 327 vacant addresses.  This accounts for 27.2% of the 1,200 address 
tract.  The average vacancy rate for Slavic Village was 15.95%.  Figures 3 and 4 depict the 
available data from Cleveland and Northeast Ohio Indicator Data (NEO CANDO) at Case 
Western Reserve of residential foreclosure filings and residential vacant addresses in Slavic 
Village and tract 1149 over the height of the crisis from 2006-2009.  These figures 
represent the high foreclosure and vacancy rate which has resulted from the subprime 
mortgage crisis in Slavic Village.  While this crisis has caused severe blight, the data of this 
study shows that the flipped properties have benefited from the crisis and further 
perpetuated the deterioration.  The flipped properties are most likely to be properties that 
were previously foreclosed and forced back into foreclosure contributing to the 
deterioration from the foreclosure crisis.
The sales and market value assessments are telling of the problem of over inflated 
values in Slavic Village especially when compared to the condition of the properties.   The 
property sales are highly polarized. Also, there was a great deal of evidence which showed 
characteristics of flipped properties other than those identified in the selected transactions 
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Table in the task force report.   The properties not found in the task force report are either 
legitimate property flips or additional fraudulent flips.  Additional analysis will be needed 
in the future to make the differentiation.  Regardless, each of the property flips (both legal 
and illegal) have contributed to the increase in median sales values for the entire tract. 
Consequently, this will effectively increase the median county assessed market value for 
the tract.  Understanding the county appraisal process is essential to this study and 
appreciating the problem of overvaluation and the makings of a housing bubble.  The value 
of a property is determined in a large part to comparable neighboring sales.  This means 
that if a property sells, even fraudulently, for $80,000 it will increase the appraisals of the 
neighboring properties.  The result is a slew of overly inflated property values and the 
creation of a housing bubble.  Figure 4 shows the appearance of a property bubble in tract 
1149 of Slavic Village.  The percent appreciation from the previous year for sales and 
market value are high.  Of course in the period after 2006 the sales values have seriously 
plummeted. The median sales percent change is shown in Figure 5.  The median sales 
percent change shows volatile changes in the median sales in tract 1149 but illuminates the 
overall trend of a housing bubble with overall increase until 2005 and the subsequent crash. 
The market value shows a relatively stable increasing trend even with the volatile changes 
among different years.  The appreciating sales values overall before the 2006 crash and 
stable market value trend, which depict the beginnings of a housing bubble, are suspect 
when compared to the nearly 40% blight in the area. 
The condition of the properties in the area represents the concentrated blight. 
While it can most likely be assumed that other factors, such as predatory and subprime 
lending, have resulted in the deterioration of the neighborhood, it is important to assess the 
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contribution of the flipped properties and resulting foreclosure. The median home sales 
values of tract 1149 and flips in 1149 are documented in Figure 6 along with the average 
market value in the tract showing the discrepancy among flipped homes (both legally and 
illegally) and the average sales prices in tract 1149.  The large sales amounts are used to 
assess the market value of all the properties which will most certainly over inflate the 
values of deteriorated homes.  The high sales prices of flipped properties are essentially 
able to sustain the increase in the market value even when total median sales prices for 
non-flipped properties are low such as during the 2001 and 2003.
While the true number of fraudulently flipped properties in the tract is unknown, 
they account for at least 3% of the properties in the tract and most likely more.  These are 
properties that have usually been previously foreclosed properties that are purposefully 
forced back into the foreclosure cycle.  The flippers have taken advantage of the severe 
polarization and overvaluation of properties in the area.  They are able to buy a property at 
a low price and pass it off as a high valued property.
CONCLUSION
The data leads me to the conclusion that illegal property flipping can reasonably be 
associated with inequality, or rather an extension of the new inequality.  This determination 
is based on its similarities to other forms of inequality; specifically: the impact on 
neighborhood blight and foreclosures, increasing prevalence and media attention, and its 
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impact on the U.S. financial crisis.  As a result, appraisal fraud and illegal property flipping 
have debilitated low-income neighborhoods, capitalizing on their existing issues of 
inequality ultimately perpetuating and worsening them. 
The distinction of illegal property flipping as a mechanism of inequality is 
supported by the similarities it has with predatory lending.  Though lending institutions are 
the direct and apparent loser in a flipping scheme, the effects on the neighborhood and its 
residents is pervasive and widespread.  In both schemes, all the residents can be affected 
due to the consequence of foreclosures.  Also, both have capitalized on cracks in the 
mortgage lending system due to the availability of subprime loans and relaxed lending 
standards.  Banks have contributed by their lack of oversight due to their decreased risk 
with mortgage backed securities and the perpetrators are able to get away with fraud.  Both 
lending schemes are opportunistic in nature.  They are for profit schemes and have little or 
no regard for the consequences on others, most notably low-income people and 
neighborhoods.  The result is a neighborhood devastated by foreclosure, vacant properties, 
and unaffordable homeownership.
Appraisal fraud and property flipping have two additional consequences leading to 
inequality which contribute to the current U.S. financial crisis and the impact on the 
housing bubble.  Banks have been purposefully defrauded out of unaccountable amounts of 
money which has in part lead to their demise.  The flippers also capitalized on the housing 
bubble in the U.S. and perhaps sustained and added to it.  This aspect is highlighted, among 
other things, in the case study of Slavic Village.
In Slavic Village the appreciation in prices has allowed for this form of fraud and 
has in turn contributed to the appreciation of the housing market.  In the end, it has become 
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unaffordable and has lead to a severe decline in the market.  Moreover, due to the 
overvaluation of property, the values do not reflect the condition of the homes.  This is 
damaging to homeowners because it affects their ability to sell the home, perhaps because 
their mortgage is too high.  They will lose this money.  Also, if the house goes into 
foreclosure and the bank acquires the property, they have also lost money.  The 
foreclosures also have deteriorating affects on the neighborhood including the impact of the 
broken glass theory, abandoned unkempt properties, and opportunities for crime. 
Deterioration and blight ultimately results in unequal opportunities for residents.
This opportunity to commit fraud resulting in the perpetuate inequality of low-
income neighborhoods illuminates failures in the system that need to be corrected.  The 
first failure is the nature of subprime lending.  Higher standards need to be instituted to 
properly ensure that people can afford the loan they take out by eliminating no-document 
loans.  This will also eliminate an opening for fraud in the system.  Banks are not 
blameless.  In order to guarantee a more sound system for banks, borrowers, and 
neighborhood residents, the banks need to take a more proactive stance in overseeing their 
lending habits to make sure the home actually is as it appears on paper.  Mortgage brokers 
need to be regulated.  There are currently very few restrictions on becoming a broker which 
has opened the profession to fraud and deception.  The property bubble has illuminated the 
unsustainable nature of overvaluation and rapidly appreciating properties.  Even with legal 
flipping it is necessary to take precaution in revitalizing a neighborhood.  Slavic Village is 
an example of a neighborhood with polarized housing values.  If only some of the 
properties are rehabbed, this actually leads to the opportunity for lower valued homes to 
suffer through overvaluation, especially based on a deteriorated condition.  I propose that a 
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new method of county appraisals may be needed to ensure a dual housing market does not 
suffer.  Throughout the history of housing inequality, appraisals have been an integral part 
in allowing inequality to prosper.  Policymakers should keep this aspect of property values 
in mind and need to reform the system.
Inequality in housing no longer needs to be a form of intentional segregation.  The 
long standing racial and economic segregation and inequality already in place has become 
an opportunistic method for people to make a profit at the expense of the underprivileged; 
and the result is a cycle of inequality with no end in sight. 
Figure 1
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Figure 6
Average Sales Data Compared to Market Value in Tract 1149
$0.00
$10,000.00
$20,000.00
$30,000.00
$40,000.00
$50,000.00
$60,000.00
$70,000.00
$80,000.00
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Fraud Flips
Total 1149
No Flips
Median Market Value
Linear (Median Market Value)
37
Bibliography
Bauer, P., & Shenk, M. (2009, March 2). The Latest S&P Case-Shiller Housing Price 
Indexes. In The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2009/0309/04ecoact.cfm
Carr, J. H., & Kolluri, L. (2001). Predatory Lending: An Overview (Monograph). Retrieved 
Spring, 2009, from Fannie Mae Foundation Web site: 
http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/text_document_summary/article/relfiles/hot_topi
cs/Carr-Kolluri.pdf
Carr, J. H., & Kutty, N. K. (Eds.). (2008). Segregation: The Rising Cost for America. New 
York, NY: Routledge
Case Western Reserve, Cuyahoga County Auditor, & Cuyahoga Clerk of Courts. (2008). 
Cleveland and Northeast Ohio indicator data (Version Slavic Village 
Development) [Data file]. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from Case Western Reserve 
Web site: http://neocando.case.edu
Chomsisengphet, S., & Pennington-Cross, A. (2006, January/February). The Evolution of 
the Subprime Mortgage Market. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 88(1), 
31-56. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from Federal Reserve Bank Web site: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf
Chow, D., & Usher, C. (2008, November 4). Trouble in Slavic Village. NYC Pavement 
Pieces. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from New York University Web site: 
http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/pavement/in/ trouble-in-slavic-village
38
Christie, L. (2008, June 2). Lenders foot the bill for abandoned homes. CNNMoney. 
Retrieved Spring, 2009, from http://money.cnn.com
Christie, L. (2007, November 28). Foreclosure's other victims- those left behind. 
CNNMoney. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from http://money.cnn.com 
Christie, L. (2007, November 19). Crime scene: foreclosure. CNNMoney. Retrieved Spring, 
2009, from http://money.cnn.com
Christie, L. (2007, November 13). Where Cleveland went wrong. CNNMoney. Retrieved 
Spring, 2009, from http://money.cnn.com
Christie, L. (2007, November 15). Fixing foreclosure’s ground zero. CNNMoney. Retrieved 
Spring, 2009, from http://money.cnn.com
Christie, L. (2007, May 7). The ugly face of foreclosure. CNNMoney. Retrieved Spring, 
2009, from http://money.cnn.com
Christie, L. (2007, November 29). Foreclosure impact: Next stop, tax drop. CNNMoney. 
Retrieved Spring, 2009, from http://money.cnn.com
Coulton, C., Chan, T., Schramm, M., & Mikelbank, K. (2008, June). Pathways to 
Foreclosure: A Longitudinal Study of Mortgages Loans, Cleveland and Cuyahoga 
County, 2005-2008. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from Case Western Reserve 
University Web site: http://neodanco.case.edu
FBI. (2007, Fall). Mortgage Fraud Overview. In Financial Crimes Report to the Public 
Fiscal Year 2007. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from Federal Bureau of Investigations 
Web site: 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs_report2007/financial_crime_2007.ht
m#Mortgage
39
FBI. (2008, April). 2007 Mortgage Fraud Report. In Federal Bureau of Investigations. 
Retrieved Spring, 2009, from Federal Bureau of Investigations Web site: 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage_fraud07.htm
FBI (2007, May). 2006 Mortgage Fraud Report. In Federal Bureau of Investigations. 
Retrieved Spring, 2009, from Federal Bureau of Investigations Web site: 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage_fraud06.htm
FinCen. (2009, February). Filing Trends in Mortgage Loan Fraud. Retrieved Spring, 2009, 
from http://fincen.gov
FinCen. (2006, November). FinCEN Mortgage Loan Fraud Assessment. Retrieved Spring, 
2009, from http://fincen.gov
FinCen. (2008, April). Mortgage Loan Fraud: An Update of Trends based Upon Analysis 
of Suspicious Activity Reports. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from 
     http://fincen.gov
Focer, A. (2000, September/October). Flip..Flip...Flip..Flop. In National Housing Institute 
Shelterforce. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from 
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/113/focer.html
Gotham, K. F. (2002). Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City 
Experience, 1900-2000. SUNY Press.
Gotham, K. F. (2000). Separate and Unequal: The Housing Act of 1968 and the Section 
235 Program. Sociological Forum, 15(1), 13-37. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from 
http://www.tulane.edu/~kgotham/Separate&Unequal.pdf
40
Haddad, G., Huml, P., Holdford, M. B., Bak, G., & Gliha, C. (Speakers). (2008). 
Conversations in Slavic Village. Cleveland, OH: Case Western Reserve 
Symposium. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from Case Western Reserve Web site: 
http://blog.case.edu/wrss/
Hirsh, M. (2008, June 2). Mortgages and madness: Questionable lending practices turned a 
peaceful Cleveland neighborhood into a blighted slum. Newsweek, 1-3. Retrieved 
Spring, 2009, from http://www.newsweek.com/id/138503
HMDA. (2009). Home Mortgage Disclosure Act [Data]. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from 
FFIEC. Website: http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/
HUD. (2008, April 8). Fair Housing Laws and Executive Orders. In Department of  
Housing and Urban Development. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from 
http://hud.gov/offices/fheo/FHLaws/
Immergluck, D., and Smith, G. (2006). The external costs of foreclosure: The impact of 
single-family mortgage foreclosures on property values. Housing Policy Debate, 
Volume 17(1): 57-80.
Immergluck, D., and Smith, G. (2006). The external costs of foreclosure: The impact of 
single-family mortgage foreclosures on property values. Housing Policy Debate, 
Volume 17(1): 57-80.
 Joint Economic Committee Cong. (2007), Local Look at the National Foreclosure Crisis: 
Cleveland Families, Neighborhoods, Economy Under Siege from the subprime 
Mortgage Fallout http://jec.senate.gov/index.cfm?
FuseAction=Hearings.HearingsCalendar&ContentRecord_id=7e4d4491-7e9c-9af9-
7ce7-ba13aa797cb3& Region_id=&Issue_id=.
41
Karlsson, S. (2004, November 1). America's Unsustainable Boom. In Ludwig von Mises 
Institute. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from http://www.mises.org/story/1670
Kotlowitz, A. (2009, March 4). All boarded up. New York Times Magazine. Retrieved 
Spring, 2009, from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/magazine/08Foreclosure-
t.html?_r=2&ref=magazine
Massey D. & Denton N. (1993) American Apartheid. Harvard University Press Bond, C., 
& Williams, R. (2007, December). Residential Segregation and the Transformation 
of Home Mortgage Lending. Social Forces. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from 
LexisNexis database
Neighborhood Link. (2000). North/South Broadway. In Neighborhood Tour. Retrieved 
Spring, 2009, from Cleveland State University Web site: 
http://www.nhlink.net/neighborhoodtour
Office of the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor. (2008, October). Kellogg, Cody, Boyd, and 
four companies indicted for mortgage fraud. Office of the Prosecuting Attorney 
Cuyahoga County. Retrieved  Spring, 2009, from 
http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/mnc.aspx?type=HotTopic&mcid=427
Pugh, S. (2009, Spring). Interview with Stacy Pugh Slavic Village Housing Director.
The Slavic Village Vacant and Abandoned Property Task Force, with support of 
Neighborhood Progress Incorporated, & Slavic Village Development. (2008). 
Subprime lending, real estate flipping and the foreclosure crisis in Slavic Village 
2003-2008.
42
Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Robert J. Sampson. "Ecometrics: Toward a Science of 
Assessing Ecological Settings, with Application to the Systematic Social 
Observation of Neighborhoods," Sociological Methodology, Vol. 29 (1999): 1-41.
Raudenbush S. and Sampson, Robert J. "Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the 
Social Construction of 'Broken Windows,'" Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 67, 4 
(2004): 319-342.
Richardson, M. S. (2005). An American Epidemic: Mortgage Fraud- A Serious Business. 
Lincoln, NE: IUniverse.
 Roberts, R. (2008, October 3). How Government Stoked the Mania. The Wall Street 
Journal. Retrieved Spring, 2009, from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122298982558700341.html
Statement Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, (April 1, 2009) (testimony of 
John S. Pistole), FBI.gov.
Squires G. and Kubrin C. (2006). Privileged Places: Race, Residence, and the Structure of  
Opportunity. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Squires, G. D. (1994). Capital and Communities in Black and White. SUNY.
Williams, R., Nesiba, R., & Mcconnell, E. D. (2005). The Changing Face of Inequality in 
Home Mortgage Lending. Social Problems, 52(2), 181-208. Retrieved Spring, 
2009, from LexisNexis database.
43
